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Parental Involvement in Adolescent Abortion
Decisions: A Legal and Psychological Critique
Melody G. Embree* and Tracy A. Dobson, J.D.**
Introduction
Adolescent pregnancy is a problem of troubling proportions.
According to a 1988 report, the United States has the highest teen
pregnancy rate of all industrialized countries, and the rate contin-
ues to increase.' Over one million adolescent pregnancies were re-
ported in 1980.2 Given the estimated level of teenage sexual
activity, this is not surprising. In a national study of youth, re-
searchers found that 64 percent of boys and 44 percent of girls
were sexually active by their eighteenth birthday.3 By age twenty,
over 80 percent of males and over 70 percent of females reported
having had sexual intercourse. 4 In addition, 40 percent of women
who were twenty years old in 1982 reported at least one pregnancy
during their teen years.5
Relatively speaking, the number of teens who become
mothers each year is not overwhelming. However, the societal and
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GRAMS IN HUMAN SERVICES, Focus ON CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 6 (Supp.,
1988).
2. Gloria Zakus & Sandra Wilday, Adolescent Abortion Option, 12 Soc. WORK
IN HEALTH CARE 77 (1987). More recent data show that little change has occurred.
In 1983, 489,000 babies were born to teens, and 411,000 teens obtained abortions.
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4. Id. at 41.
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individual consequences of this choice can be serious. In the early
1980s about 15 percent of all births in the United States were to
teenagers. 6 About half of all teen pregnancies in the United States
are carried to term.7 In 1983, for example, there were 489,000
births to teens and 411,000 abortions performed on teens aged fif-
teen to nineteen.8 There is no national system to collect informa-
tion about women who give birth and then give the child up for
adoption. For that reason, precise data regarding teens who relin-
quish their children for adoption is not available. Results from a
study conducted in 1982, however, revealed that about 4 percent of
unmarried teen mothers age fifteen to nineteen gave their chil-
dren up for adoption.9
This article analyzes the legal issues and policy questions un-
derlying parental-consent or notification requirements in the ado-
lescent abortion context. It also establishes the need for additional
research and the dissemination of information regarding minors'
access to abortion for unwanted pregnancies to better inform the
policymaking process. In Section I, we discuss the consequences of
adolescent pregnancy for the teen, her child(ren), and society. In
Section II, a brief overview of teen pregnancy prevention programs
is given. Section III reviews Supreme Court cases pertaining to pa-
rental-consent and notification legislation. Section IV elucidates
the four fundamental assumptions the Court has relied upon when
making decisions regarding the validity of parental involvement
requirements. Pertinent psychological research is examined for
each of these assumptions in Section V. Section VI discusses con-
clusions and suggestions for future policy and research directions
to help resolve the parental involvement issue.
I. Consequences of Teen Pregnancy
The current proliferation of legislation meant to limit access
to abortion, combined with a paucity of legislation and resources
committed to helping adolescents avoid pregnancy, has led some
commentators to conclude that this country does not care about its
young people.1O Researchers M. Joycelyn Elders, Jennifer Hui and
Steff Padilla have pointed out that information is available about
the causes of teen pregnancy and ways to prevent it.1 Nonethe-
6. Higgins, supra note 1, at 8.
7. Zakus & Wilday, supra note 2, at 77.
8. Moore, supra note 2, at 2.
9. NATIONAL RESEARCH CoUNcIL, supra note 3, at 64.
10. M. Joycelyn Elders, Jennifer Hui, & Steff Padilla, Adolescent Pregnancy:
Does the Nation Really Care?, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 170, 172 (1990).
11. Id. at 172.
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less these writers argue that the United States refuses to effec-
tively address teen pregnancy because it is seen as a justifiable
punishment for premarital sex.12 Consequently, they conclude
that the United States is willing to allow many of its young people
to fall short of their educational, economic, and personal
potential.' 3
The consequences of adolescent pregnancy are numerous and
serious. A teenager who keeps her child is less likely to finish
high school and more likely to be poor and supported by welfare.14
According to the National Research Council, the estimated tax-
payer costs in 1985 for Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), Medicaid, and food stamps for families begun by birth to
a teen were $16.6 billion.15 In general, women who begin having
children while they are teens have more children and space them
more closely together than women who wait until they are older
to become parents.16
Health risks for children born under such circumstances are
also significant. Infant mortality rates of babies born to teens are
40 percent higher than for mothers aged twenty to twenty-four.17
In 1981, low birth weight babies (5.5 pounds or less) were twice as
likely to be born to mothers under age fifteen and 33 percent more
likely to be born to mothers aged fifteen to nineteen than to
mothers aged twenty to twenty-four.'S In the first twenty-eight
days after birth, low birth weight babies are forty times more
likely to die than normal weight infants.' 9 Low birth weight is
correlated with medical problems such as birth defects and pro-
longed illness2O as well as with infant mortality. Chronic illness,
financial hardships and emotional stress are additional problems
faced by families with low birth weight infants.21
For younger teens physiological immaturity contributes di-
rectly to the low birth weight and infant mortality of their chil-
dren.22 For older teens, age of the mother alone does not account
12. Id.
13. Id. at 179-80.
14. Higgins, supra note 1, at 12-13.
15. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supr note 3, at 205-206.
16. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH OF ADOLES-
CENTS 7-8 (1989).
17. Jeanne Griffith, THE CHILDREN OF TEENAGE MOTHERS, in CONG. Rrs.
SERV., REP. No. 87-94 at 13 (1987).
18. Id. at 16.
19. Id. at 15.
20. Id. at 42.
21. Id. at 42-45.
22. Id. at 15, 42.
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for low birth weight and infant mortality. Factors such as educa-
tion level, socioeconomic status, personal habits, and inadequate
prenatal care each associated only in part with age also contribute
to problems of early childbearing.23
Disadvantages for children born to adolescent mothers con-
tinue as the children mature. Cognitive development has been
found to be significantly related to the mother's age, even when
other factors such as sex, race, family size, education and income
levels of parents, and birth order are taken into account. 24 Chil-
dren of adolescent mothers consistently score lower on intelligence
tests, 25 and it has been established that IQ scores of such children
are adversely affected by factors such as family size, degree of so-
cial support, and socioeconomic status.26
Children born to adolescent mothers also suffer from poor
scholastic achievement. In a national study based on data collected
in 1976 and 1981, a representative sample was employed to assess
factors related to educational success. Both white and African-
American children whose mothers were seventeen or younger at
their child's birth were almost three times as likely to be behind a
grade level as were children whose mothers were twenty-five or
older at their child's birth.27 The children of adolescent mothers
were also less likely to perform well on vocabulary tests and to be
assessed by their teachers as succeeding in school. 28 It is impor-
tant to note that the age of the mother at the birth of her first
child does not necessarily directly affect school performance.
Rather, her age at first birth affects family size, family structure,
and her own educational achievement, 29 which in turn affects the
likelihood that she and her children will be poor.30 All of these
mediating factors have an impact on the child's ability to do well
in school.3 1
Although the research is not conclusive, behavioral problems
of children born to teen mothers have also been documented.
These children, for example, display higher levels of antisocial be-
havior.32 White children aged eleven to sixteen whose mothers
were eighteen or younger at their birth were more than twice as
23. Id. at 15.
24. Id. at 45-46.
25. Id. at 46.
26. Id. at 43-44.
27. Id. at 46-47.
28. Id. at 46.
29. Id at 46-47.
30. Id. at 47.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 51-53.
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likely as children born to mothers aged twenty-five or older to
have had problems in school that included stealing, suspension, ex-
pulsion, or some type of parental intervention.33 They were also
more likely to fight at school.34 Similar but less extreme differ-
ences were found among African-American children.3 5 Finally,
white adolescents born of teen mothers were 33 percent less likely
and African-American adolescents of teen mothers were 60 per-
cent less likely to think that they might wait until age twenty-one
to become a parent.3 6
The effect on children born to mothers who were forced to
carry to term the unwanted pregnancy also merits consideration.
Researchers Henry David and Zdenek Matejcek followed two
matched groups of 220 children born in Czechoslovakia between
1961 and 1963.37 The experimental group was born to mothers
who were twice denied permission to abort.3 8 The control group
was born to mothers who did not seek abortion.39 In general, the
unwanted children were found to be disadvantaged compared to
the control children. They had more problems with learning,40
more behavioral problems, 41 and were less likely to continue their
education.42 Boys, but not girls, perceived their parents' relation-
ship as unstable and felt unaccepted by their mothers.43 Com-
pared to the control group, girls in the experimental group held
more liberal attitudes toward sexuality, drugs and alcohol, and di-
vorce.44 David and Matejcek concluded that unwanted children
have more problems than wanted children, and that these dispari-
ties increase across time.45
Clearly, adolescent childbearing can have harmful effects on
mothers, their children, and society. In addition, denial of abor-
tions to mothers who do not wish to carry a pregnancy to term can
produce negative consequences for children born under such cir-
cumstances. Although the problems associated with adolescent
33. Id. at 52-53.
34. Id. at 53.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Henry David & Zdenek Matejcek, Children Born to Women Denied Abor-
tion: An Update, 13 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 32 (1981).
38. Id. at 32.
39. Id.




44. Id. at 33-34.
45. Id. at 34.
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pregnancy have been clearly documented, effective responses have
not been forthcoming.
II. Teen Pregnancy Prevention Efforts
Many solutions to the problem of unwanted teen pregnancy
have been proposed and attempted. Among these are education
about a variety of aspects of sexuality,46 enhancing life options,47
encouraging sexual abstinence,48 and increasing access to contra-
ceptives. 49 Unfortunately, as previously noted,50 the problem con-
tinues unabated. Sex education, depending upon how and when it
is presented, and what information is made available, shows prom-
ise for encouraging adolescents to use contraception after becom-
ing sexually active.5 ' Despite concerns expressed by critics, sex
education has not been shown to significantly affect the age at
which sexual activity begins,5 2 nor has it led to increased preg-
nancy rates.5 3 Such criticism has, however, kept effective sex edu-
cation from being widely available to young people.5 4
Increased contraceptive availability, in the absence of wide-
spread education, has also not affected pregnancy rates.55 Miscon-
ceptions abound regarding contraceptive use and safety.5 Many
teens use birth control devices only sporadically, if at all,57 and
often they do not begin birth control use until well after they have
become sexually active.5 8 Almost 52 percent of teens who do not
use birth control become pregnant within two years of becoming
sexually active.59 Of those teens who do use birth control, 25 per-
cent who use a non-medical form and 15 percent who use a medi-
cal form also become pregnant within two years.60 Thus, it seems
imperative that effective contraceptive use begin with initiation of




50. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
51. Higgins, supra note 1, at 41.
52. William Marsiglio & Frank L. Mott, The Impact of Sex Education on Sexual
Activity, Contraceptive Use, and Premarital Pregnancy Among American Teenag-
ers, 18 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 158-59 (1986).
53. Id. at 160.
54. Elders, Hui, & Padilla, supra note 10.
55. Evylyn Landry, Jane T. Bertrand, Flora Cherry, & Jane Rice, Teen Preg-
nancy in New Orleans: Factors that Differentiate Teens Who Deliver, Abor4 and
Successfully Contracept, 15 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 259 (1986).
56. Id. at 269, 271.






sexual activity. In particular, school-based clinics which provide
contraceptive services show promise for encouraging teens to wait
before becoming sexually active and for increasing the use of birth
control.6 1
For those teens who become pregnant, adoption is a poten-
tially significant alternative to both early parenthood and abor-
tion.62  Indeed, the Adolescent Family Life Demonstration
Projects program, which became law in 1981 as Title XX of the
Public Health Services Act,63 calls for ways to make adoption a de-
sirable choice for pregnant teens. Yet, only about 4 percent of
teens find this a viable option for pregnancy resolution.64
At present, most pregnant teens choose to carry the preg-
nancy to term and keep the child65 or to abort the pregnancy.6 6 To
reduce the negative impacts of adolescent pregnancy, it is impera-
tive to continue efforts to find and to make broadly available relia-
ble ways to prevent teen pregnancy. Until the United States
succeeds in preventing most teen pregnancies, the unfortunate re-
alities of teenage parenthood present a compelling rationale for
continuing to allow abortion as a legal alternative to adolescent
child-bearing.
III. Supreme Court Review of Parental Involvement Legislation
Given the importance of the abortion question to the United
States public, one would expect the issue to win Supreme Court at-
tention. A steady stream of cases has flowed from the Court be-
ginning with its landmark 1973 decision, Roe v. Wade.67 In this
historic case, the Court held that a woman's right to personal pri-
vacy included the right to decide whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.68 Immediately after Roe was handed down, abortion
during the first trimester of pregnancy was legal. The decision did
not speak to minors' rights. Soon after, however, some states and
Congress moved to enact legislation limiting the exercise of abor-
tion rights. Many states focused their attention on minors and
sought to restrict access to abortion by requiring parental involve-
ment in abortion decisions. Subsequently, formidable barriers in
the form of parental consent or notification legislation have been
61. Higgins, supra note 1, at 43-44.
62. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 227.
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 (1989).
64. See supra note 9, and accompanying text.
65. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 161.
66. Id.




placed before many teens who wish to abort. Over the last fifteen
years, continuing efforts to regulate minors' access to abortion,
through laws requiring them to obtain parental consent, to notify
parents of their intent to abort, or to seek a judge's permission to
abort have proliferated. Currently, thirty-five states have legisla-
tion requiring some degree of parental involvement in minors'
abortion decisions6 9 and an additional three mandate counseling in
which parental involvement may be required.70 Of the thirty-five,
fifteen are currently being actively enforced.71
The Supreme Court's first opportunity to review a parental
consent law came in 1976 in Planned Parenthood of Missouri v.
Danforth.72 Only part of the case was relevant specifically to mi-
nors. Danforth involved a Missouri statute which prohibited first
trimester abortions without the written consent of a parent or
guardian if the woman was unmarried and under age eighteen, un-
less the abortion was necessary to save her life.73 The Court held
that states could not impose a blanket provision denying a minor
69. ALA. CODE §§ 26-21-1 to -8 (Supp. 1990); ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(a)(3)
(1986), ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 12, § 40.060 (July 1988); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-2152, -2153 (Supp 1989); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-16-801 to -808 (Michie Supp.
1989); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958 (West Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-6-101 (1986) (enacted 1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24 § 1790(b)(3) (1987); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 390.001(4) (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-11-110 to -117
(Michie 1990); IDAHO CODE § 18-609(6) (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 81-64 to -68
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2.5 (Burns Supp. 1991); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.732 (Baldwin 1990); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5 (West
Supp. 1990), § 40.1299.33D (West 1977); MD. HEALTH-GEN CODE ANN. § 20-103
(1990); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 112, § 12S (Law Co-op. 1991); 1990 MICH. PUB. ACTS
NO. 211; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 (West 1989); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-51 to -63
(Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028 (Vernon Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 50-20-107 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-347 (1989), § 43-2101 (1988); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. 442.255 (Michie 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1.C (Michie 1984) (en-
acted 1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-0.2.1-03.1 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2919.12 (Anderson 1990), § 2151.85 (Anderson 1990); 19 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3206 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4.7-6 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-41-31 to 37
(Law Co-op. Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 34-23A-7 (1986), § 26-1-1
(1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-10-301 to 307 § 39-15-202(f) (Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-7-304(2), § 15-2-1 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.070 (West 1988)
(enacted 1970); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-2F-1 to -5 (1985); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-6-101, to
-118 (Supp 1991).
70. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-600 to -601 (West Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22 § 1597-A (West Supp. 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.78 (West 1989).
71. The states are: Alabama, Arizona, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. NATIONAL ABORTION RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE, WHO
DECIDES? A STATE BY STATE REVIEW OF ABORTION RIGHTS (1991).
72. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
73. The version ruled invalid in Danforth was cited as H.C.S. House Bill No.
1211, § 3(4). 428 U.S. at 85. The current version, requiring written consent of one
parent, appears as Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028, 1(1) (Vernon 1983, Supp. 1991).
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the right to an abortion,7 4 nor could parents have "absolute, and
possibly arbitrary, veto" power over a minor's decision to termi-
nate her pregnancy.75 Justice Blackmun's majority opinion, joined
by Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Powell (Justice Ste-
vens joined the majority decision, but objected to the Court's inval-
idation of the parental consent requirement), foreshadowed
decisions which relied on a mature/imnature minor distinction by
stating, "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority.
Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and
possess constitutional rights."76 In a separate opinion, Justice Ste-
vens intimated that states' interests in minors' well-being were
sufficiently compelling to permit some restrictions on their ability
to consent to abortion.77 The majority opinion also implied that
more narrowly drawn parental consent legislation could pass con-
stitutional muster.7 8
Some states responded to the Court's invitation in Darvforth
by passing narrowly drawn legislation which gave parents a voice
in minors' abortion decision-making. The second challenge to a pa-
rental involvement law was presented in the 1979 case Bellotti v.
Baird (cited as Bellotti II).7 9 In this case a Massachusetts statute
provided that if the mother was less than eighteen and not mar-
ried, consent of the minor and both of her parents was required
for an abortion to be performed, but that if one or both parents re-
fused, consent could be obtained from a judge for "good cause
shown."8 0 A plurality in Bellotti II found that Massachusetts' in-
terest in protecting minors extended to requiring parental involve-
ment.8 1 At the same time, however, the Court established the
requirement of a waiver procedure by which a minor could demon-
strate sufficient maturity to make her own abortion decision in-
dependent of her parents,8 2 or if she lacked maturity, she could
demonstrate that an abortion without parental involvement would
nonetheless be in her best interests.83
Building on the approach developed in the parental consent
74. 428 U.S. at 74.
75. Id. at 74-75.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 102-05.
78. Id. at 74-75.
79. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
80. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West Supp. 1979).
81. 443 U.S. at 640.




cases, two years later, in H.L. v. Matheson,8 4 the Court addressed
the separate issue of the constitutionality of parental notification
laws. The Utah statute in question required that prior to perform-
ing a minor's abortion, the physician must notify her parents or
guardian, if possible.8 5 In this case, Utah's statute was upheld in a
narrow holding, influenced by the fact that notification alone does
not amount to veto power.86 The majority decision, authored by
Chief Justice Burger, discussed a possible mature/immature minor
distinction. Since the fifteen year old plaintiff did not offer evi-
dence that she met the qualification of maturity or emancipation,8 7
the Court declined to rule on the issue of whether notification
placed an undue burden on a mature minor.8 8
In 1983, the Supreme Court decided two cases involving pa-
rental consent legislation. In City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc. ,89 the Court considered the constitution-
ality of an Akron ordinance which required a physician to obtain
the informed written consent of a parent or legal guardian before
performing an abortion on a minor under age fifteen, unless she
had obtained a court order giving permission for her abortion.90
Following the reasoning previously advanced in Bellotti 1191 re-
garding the desirability of parental involvement in minor's abor-
tion decisions, the Court cited three reasons why minors' rights are
not equal to those of adults: (1) "the peculiar vulnerability of chil-
dren;"9 2 (2) "their inability to make critical decisions in an in-
formed, mature manner;"9 3 and (3) "the importance of the
parental role in child rearing."94 Nonetheless, the Court con-
cluded that minors must have an alternative to seeking parental
permission to abort and that the procedure for judicial bypass
must be clearly delineated rather than left to interpretation. 5 In
his majority opinion, Justice Powell declared the statute unconsti-
tutional because it was too vague96 and noted that "[a] majority of
the Court... has indicated that [these] state and parental interests
[on which parental notice laws have been based] must give way to
84. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
85. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1974).
86. 450 U.S. at 411.
87. Id. at 405-07.
88. Id. at 398.
89. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
90. AKRON OHIO CODE § 1870.05(B) (1978).
91. 462 U.S. at 439.
92. 443 U.S. at 634.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 462 U.S. 439-41.
96. Id. at 44041.
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the constitutional right of a mature minor or of an immature mi-
nor whose best interests are contrary to parental involvement." 9
7
In the second case heard by the Supreme Court in 1983,
Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. v.
Ashcroft,98 the Court upheld a parental or judicial consent statute
that established a two-step procedure for courts to use when re-
viewing minors' abortion requests. 99 The two-step analysis assured
that good cause for denying a petition to abort meant the court
must first find the minor to be sufficiently immature to make her
own decision, and then find that the abortion would not be in her
best interest.1 o
The two most recent Supreme Court decisions regarding pa-
rental consent legislation were handed down in 1990. In Hodgson
v. Minnesota,101 in a five to four decision, the Court reiterated the
position first established in Bellotti II.102 The majority held that a
judicial bypass mechanism is necessary to avoid undue infringe-
ment of constitutionally protected rights. The statute required at
least a forty-eight hour waiting period after notification of both
parents, before the abortion could be performed.10 3 The Court
found that this requirement did not place an undue burden on the
minor because it often ran concurrent to abortion scheduling.104 A
separate subsection provided for a judicial bypass mechanism if the
more restrictive two parent notification without judicial bypass re-
quirement was enjoined.105 The dissenting justices believed that
the two parent notification requirement was unconstitutional.
They reasoned that the requirement did not further the state's in-
terests in promoting parent-teen communication, nor did it assure
that the minor would make the best possible decision.'9 6
In the second 1990 case, Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health,1o7 the Court considered the constitutionality of an
Ohio ordinance which required the physician who would perform
the abortion to personally notify one parent before performing the
abortion, 0 8 unless the minor had either obtained permission to
97. Id. at 428, n.10.
98. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
99. Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.028 (Supp. 1982).
100. 462 U.S. at 493.
101. 110 S.Ct. 2926 (1990).
102. 443 U.S. at 643-44.
103. MINN. STAT. § 144.343(2) (1981).
104. 110 S.Ct. at 2926.
105. MINN. STAT. § 144.343(6) (1981).
106. 110 S.Ct. at 2945-49.
107. 110 S.Ct. 2972 (1990).
108. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12(B)(1)(a)(i) (Anderson 1982).
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abort without parental notification in a judicial bypass proce-
dure' 0 9 or to receive an expedited review. 110 Clear and convincing
evidence of a minor's maturity or that the abortion would be in
her best interests without parental notification was also required
by the statute."' Writing for the Court in a six to three decision,
Justice Kennedy stated that a law requiring minors to provide
clear and convincing evidence of their maturity when seeking a ju-
dicial waiver does not violate due process rights.1l 2 The judicial
waiver itself was at issue in this case. The Court perceived an at-
tempt by appellees to weaken its criteria by (1) granting the mi-
nor permission to abort automatically if the courts did not act
within prescribed time limits,1 1 3 (2) not requiring a clear and con-
vincing evidence standard for proving maturity or best interests,
11 4
and (3) requiring simplification of the pleading so as not to inter-
fere with the minor's due process rights."l5 The Court refused to
weaken the criteria.116 In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens
concluded that the state must provide a means by which mature
minors, or minors whose best interests would not be served by no-
tification, could avoid parental notification.1 17 He stated, however,
that the mechanism need not be judicial.1 8
In summary, the Supreme Court has been fairly consistent in
its consideration of parental involvement legislation. The Court
has held to precedent and found unconstitutional legislation in
which a single parent has the potential to veto a teen's abortion de-
cision.119 The justices continue to find the question of when a mi-
nor's constitutional right to privacy equals that of adults
troublesome.120 Additionally, even though parental involvement is
viewed positively, the Court has not allowed parents' rights to
carry more weight than those of teens'. Because of personnel
changes on the Court, however, the recent six to three decision in
109. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12(B)(1)(a)(iv) (Anderson 1987).
110. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.073(A) (Anderson 1986).
111. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.85(C) (Anderson 1986).
112. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 110 S.Ct. at 2981-82 (1990).
113. Id. at 2981.
114. Id. at 2981-82.
115. Id. at 2982.
116. Id. at 2978-2981.
117. Id. at 2994.
118. Id.
119. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); City of
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
120. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); City of Akron,
462 U.S. 416; Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S.
476 (1983); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (1990).
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Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health 121 likely bodes a
more conservative hearing for future parental involvement legisla-
tion.122 At a minimum, it seems that the justices have been craft-
ing their decisions to instruct policymakers on ways in which to
write ever more restrictive parental involvement laws that will
pass constitutional muster.
Perhaps there is a paradox operating here. As the Court has
insisted upon laws that allow adolescents some leeway in demon-
strating their maturity and making their own decisions, legisla-
tures intent on denying teens access to abortion have achieved
little success in passing legislation that both meets their goal and is
constitutional. Yet, undaunted in the face of repeated failure, state
legislatures continue their search for a constitutionally acceptable
formulation.123
IV. The Role of Psychology in Parental Involvement Legislation
Although largely ignored by the United States Supreme
Court, psychological research bears importantly on the adolescent
abortion question. The issue of parental involvement for minors is
especially salient to psychologists because the assumptions upon
which courts have based their decisions have psychological founda-
tions. The Court (as well as state legislatures) has relied heavily
upon psychological assumptions to inform and shape their conclu-
sions, many of which do not reflect relevant empirical evidence. In
this area, four assumptions emerge as critical to the Court's deci-
sions: 1) minors are not competent decision-makers, 2) abortion is
psychologically harmful to minors, 3) family cohesion and good
decision-making are promoted by parental involvement, and 4) pa-
rental rights supercede those of minors.
A. Informed Decision-Makers
To assess the correctness of the Court's reliance on these as-
sumptions pertinent psychological research will be discussed. The
first assumption focuses on the minor's supposed level of maturity.
Since adults' right to give informed consent for treatment rests
upon the belief that they are able to understand the consequences
and implications of their decisions, the state generally may not in-
terfere with their right to privacy when making such decisions.
This was the rationale employed in Roe v. Wade.124 In contrast,
121. 110 S.Ct. 2972.
122. See supra note 69.
123. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
124. See supra note 120.
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the Court's parental involvement opinions indicate the belief that
at least some minors lack sufficient maturity to make informed de-
cisions regarding pregnancy resolution.125 The state's interest in
protecting minors from making incorrect or "bad" decisions has
justified the limitation on minors' constitutional rights. 26
Danforth, 27 the first parental involvement case to be heard
by the Supreme Court, established that minors have a right to pri-
vacy regarding abortion decisions,128 that some minors are suffi-
ciently mature to make their own abortion decisions, 29 and that
parents may not have absolute veto power over a minor's abortion
decision.130 At the same time, the Court left open the possibility
of future challenges to minors' right to privacy by stating that
their decision should not be construed to imply that "every minor,
regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent for termi-
nation of her pregnancy."' 3 ' Even more to the point, in a dissent-
ing opinion, three justices wrote that states are entitled "to protect
children from their own immature and improvident decisions." 32
Thus, Danforth set the stage for subsequent cases to call into
question minors' "maturity." Although the Court has not defined
the concept of maturity as it relates to abortion, it has since
handed down decisions that infringe upon minors' right to privacy
based upon an assumption that they are insufficiently mature to
make a reasoned decision on their own, and thus will reach a "bet-
ter" decision if assisted by a parent. 33 For example, in Ohio v. Ak-
ron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., Justice Kennedy stated,
A free and enlightened society may decide that each of its
members should attain a clearer, more tolerant understanding
of the profound philosophic choices confronted by a woman
who is considering whether to seek an abortion. Her decision
will embrace her own destiny and personal dignity, and the or-
igins of the other human life that lie within the embryo. The
State is entitled to assume that, for most of its people, the be-
ginnings of that understanding will be within the family, soci-
125. Belloti, 443 U.S. at 634-39. See also, Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 110
S.Ct. at 2979-81; Hodgson, 110 S.Ct. at 2942-44; Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 491; Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67
(1944).
126. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
127. Id. at 74-75.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 75.
131. Id. at 95 (White, J., dissenting).
132. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); See also Planned Parenthood Ass'n of
Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 472 (1983); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (1990).
133. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (1990).
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ety's most intimate association.134
B. The Psychological Consequences of Abortion
The second basis upon which minors' right to reproductive
choice may be limited in the view of the Supreme Court is that
their youth makes girls particularly vulnerable to presumed nega-
tive affects of abortion. Further, it is clear that the issue in ques-
tion is specifically abortion, not pregnancy in general. In deciding
H.L. v. Matheson, the Court concluded that "[i]f the pregnant girl
elects to carry her child to term, the [medical] decisions to be
made entail few-perhaps none--of the potentially grave emo-
tional and psychological consequences of the decision to abort (em-
phasis in original)."135 In formulating its holding, the Matheson
Court relied on scientifically unsubstantiated psychoanalytic im-
pressions by Hrair M. Babikian and Adila Goldman of teens who
bore a child, and a questionable study by Judith S. Wallerstein, Pe-
ter Kurtz, and Marion Bar-Din that employed a small, specialized
sample of teens who were under clinical treatment. 136 Based on
these findings, the Court concluded that teens are much more neg-
atively impacted by abortion than are adults. It seems ironic that
in the one case in which the Court majority attempts to bolster its
position by reference to psychological literature, it selected reports
that supported their desired policy outcome but that are substan-
tively suspect.
C. Family Cohesion
Promotion of family cohesion is cited as the third reason to
limit adolescents' abortion rights. Courts have traditionally had an
interest in protecting family integrity.137 In this respect, they have
tended to look upon the family as an independent governmental
unit and have been reluctant to interfere with its autonomy.138
For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts the Supreme Court stated
that there exists a "private realm of family life which the state
134. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 412-13 (1981).
135. Gary B. Melton & Anita J. Pliner, Adolescent Abortioa" A Psycholegal
Analysis, in ADOLESCENT ABORTION 11 (G. Melton ed. 1987) [hereinafter
ADOLESCENT].
136. See, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972); Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 495-96 (1961).
137. Lafleur, 414 U.S. at 639-40; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 231-32; Prince, 321 U.S. at 165;
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 518; See also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 495-96.




In regard to minors' abortion rights, the goal has been to ad-
vance parental involvement in the decision. The Court has rea-
soned that parental assistance is often desirable140 and that the
interests of the minor and the family will be served through pa-
rental involvement.141 The assumption in judicial decisions re-
garding parental involvement is that parents, once informed, will
make decisions that are in the best interest of their minor child.
This assumption is illustrated in the most recent Supreme Court
abortion decision in which Justice Kennedy stated,
It is both rational and fair for the State to conclude that, in
most instances, the family will strive to give a lonely or even
terrified minor advice that is both compassionate and ma-
ture.... It would deny all dignity to the family to say that the
State cannot take this reasonable step in regulating its health
professions to ensure that, in most cases, a young woman will
receive guidance and understanding from a parent.1 42
D. Parental Rights
The final argument put forth as justification for mandatory
parental involvement legislation is that children are the property
of their parents; thus, parents' rights extend to control of their mi-
nor children's decisions.' 43 The reasoning here is twofold. First, it
is argued that parents assume responsibility for their minors' care
and well-being, and thus they should take part in decisions affect-
ing their care.'" Second, parents are responsible for socializing
their children and instilling in them appropriate values.145 How-
ever, the Court has ruled that a state's interest in protecting par-
ents' interest in shaping their children's values does not supercede
the constitutional rights of a minor who acts with the consent of a
court.146
139. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-39 (1979); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 410
(1981); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (1990).
140. Hodgson, 110 S.Ct. 2926; Matheson, 450 U.S. at 410; Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633-
39 (1981).
141. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 110 S.Ct. 2972 (1990).
142. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603-04 (1979); Prince, 321 U.S. at 165-66.
143. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. at 639 (1968); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651 (1972); Lehr v. Robertson 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983).
144. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34 (1972).
145. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo.
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
146. ADOLESCENT, supra note 135, at 8.
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V. A Review of the Psychological Literature
A. Informed Decision-Making
To date, courts have not defined "maturity," the pivotal con-
cept upon which a minor's right to consent to abortion is based. 147
If a teen is mature, she is able to understand the consequences of
having an abortion and thus able to give informed consent. If she
is immature, she cannot.148 At present, a test that reliably and val-
idly measures maturity does not exist. As a result, judges have no
precise guidelines and their assessments of a minor's maturity
must necessarily be the result of individual interpretation of the
definition. Psychologists and other experts have defined a mature
minor as one who is able to make an informed, intelligent, un-
coerced decision. 149 Efforts to make the definition measurable
have led social science researchers to rely upon a minor's ability to
1) understand situations and their possible outcomes, 2) reason ef-
fectively about positive and negative consequences of each out-
come, 3) understand ways in which the consequences fit within
the framework of values and goals, and 4) make a proactive, un-
coerced decision. x5 0
Using these criteria, researchers have found few differences
between minors' and adults' decision-making abilities. Minors ap-
pear to be more likely than adults to view their decision to abort
as externally determined.151 When comparing older minors (age
fourteen to seventeen) to adults, minors have been found to be as
competent as adults at understanding alternatives and conse-
quences, and they make their decisions by similar processes.1 52
Even very young minors (age nine), despite a general poorer un-
derstanding of the decision-making process and its consequences,
nonetheless appear to be capable of making a meaningful contribu-
tion to decisions regarding personal health care.153 By age four-
147. Id.
148. Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors' Consent to Treatment: A Develop-
mental PerSpective, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412, 416 (1978); Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B.
Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treat-
ment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589 (1982); Walter J. Wadlington, Consent to Medi-
cal Care for Minors: The Legal Framework in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE To
CONSENT 57 (G. Melton ed. 1983).
149. Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents'
Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
(forthcoming 1992).
150. Catherine C. Lewis, A Comparison of Minors' and Adults' Pregnancy Deci-
sions, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 446 (1980).





teen adolescents perform comparably to older minors and adults in
their ability to make rational choices.I54
Additionally, minors have shown themselves to be able to un-
derstand the consequences of abortion and childbirth'55 A recent
study of pregnancy resolution decision-making that compared mi-
nors and adults found that only minors who were age fifteen or
less and who did not consider abortion were less competent than
adults. 56 Minors who chose abortion to resolve their unwanted
pregnancy, regardless of their age, demonstrated competency com-
parable to that of adults.157 Researchers Bruce Ambuel and Julian
Rappaport suggested that the differences they found can be attrib-
uted to the heightened anxiety associated with choosing to carry a
pregnancy to term.158
In summary, an overview of research relating to decision-
making competence regarding pregnancy resolution suggests that
substantial differences between adults and minors in decision-mak-
ing ability do not exist. After age thirteen, teens have demon-
strated reasoning competence comparable to that of an average
adult. Melton asserts that when employing criteria used by courts
to assess competence to consent, older adolescents do not differ on
average from adults.159 In addition, no research suggests that mi-
nors over age thirteen are unable to make reasoned decisions.
B. Psychological Consequences of Abortion
Court decisions have rested upon the assumption that the
consequences of abortion may be harmful to the psychological
well-being of anyone, but the consequences are particularly severe
for minors. 60 An extensive cross-cultural review of over 100 stud-
ies conducted between 1936 and 1988 was assembled by the Public
Interest Directorate of the American Psychological Association.
They concluded that the psychological consequences of elective
154. Lewis, supra note 150, at 452.
155. Ambuel & Rappaport, supra note 149.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 24.
158. Gary B. Melton, Knowing What We Do Know: APA and Adolescent Abor-
tion, 45 Am. PsYcHoLOGisT 1171, 1172 (1990).
159. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 90 (1976) (Stew-
art, J., concurring); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1979); H.L. v. Matheson,
450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981).
160. Public Interest Directorate of the American Psychological Association, Re-
search Review: The Psychological Sequelae of Abortion 18 (1988), (unpublished re-
port to the Office of the Surgeon General, on file with LAW & INEQUALITY)
[hereinafter Public Interest Directorate].
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abortion are minimal in a vast majority of cases.16 1 The Director-
ate reported that severe emotional responses to abortion are
rare.16 2 Further, longitudinal studies have concluded that negative
feelings are strongest immediately after the abortion, and decrease
with time.163 This is not to suggest that the decision to abort is an
easy one. Indeed, it is a difficult and complex choice.' 6 4 Neverthe-
less, many researchers have found that the most commonly re-
ported post-abortion response is relief and happiness.' 6 5
Specifically regarding teens, the APA Directorate reported
on one study that found teens to be at greater risk for "anxiety,
depression, sadness, guilt, and regret."' 6 6 The researcher in that
study noted that teens have a higher rate of psychiatric problems
after giving birth as well.161 Additional studies reported that
younger women are more likely to experience negative emotions
following abortion.l6 8 Despite these findings, a study conducted
six months post-abortion by psychologists Marvin Eisen and Gail
Zellman concluded that over 80 percent of adolescent respondents
would choose abortion again if faced with an unintended preg-
nancy.' 6 9 The Directorate concluded by stating that according to
available research, "serious psychological disorders triggered by
abortion appear to be few." 70
C. Family Cohesion
The logic of family cohesiveness relies upon two assumptions.
The first is that parental involvement in minors' pregnancy resolu-
tion promotes family unity. The second is that minors will not in-
volve their parents unless forced to do so. To date, empirical
research has not been done to adequately test the family unity
claim. Available information suggests that family unity may not
be promoted by involving parents. For example, David Baptiste
reported that family therapy for a minor's pregnancy resolution
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. C. GII.JTGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VoicE, (1982); see, Public Interest Directorate,
supra note 160, at 19.
164. Public Interest Directorate, supra note 160, at 19.
165. Id. at 20.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Marvin Eisen & Gail L. Zellman, Factors Predicting Pregnancy Resolution
Satisfaction of Unmarried Adolescents, 145 J. GENETIC PSYCH. 231, 234 (1984).
169. Public Interest Directorate, supra note 160, at 21.
170. David A. Baptiste, Jr., Counseling the Pregnant Adolescent Within a Fam-
ily Context" Therapeutic Issues and Strategies, 13 FAM. THERAPY 163, 174 (1986).
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may be beneficial when the family is healthy prior to the crisis. 171
Family intervention can be harmful, however, if there are stressful
circumstances present in the family prior to the minor's
pregnancy.172
A review of existing research regarding functioning of fami-
lies with a pregnant adolescent who either planned to raise the
child or to give the child up for adoption found that these families
functioned at a significantly less optimal level than families with
teenage children who did not have a member who was an adoles-
cent mother. 7 3 An additional study examined the reactions of
parents to their pregnant teens. In this study teens reported that
their parents' reactions to their pregnancy were not as extreme as
they expected.174 They did, however, report numerous repercus-
sions to their revelation, including heightened parental control, a
decrease in the level of trust displayed toward the teen, and at-
tempts to discontinue the teen's relationship with the father of the
child.175 Three of the sixteen abortion patients (not all teens in
this study chose abortion) reported that their relationship with
their parents deteriorated after they learned of the pregnancy.176
Under ideal circumstances, it is preferable that pregnant
teens seek the support and guidance of a parent. Some teens, how-
ever, report family situations 177 in which they were fearful of dis-
cussing their pregnancy decisions with their parents. For example,
problems such as mental illness, alcoholism, fear of being ejected
from the home, threats of harm to the teenager or her partner,
and further disruption of already unhealthy family situations have
been noted by pregnant teens as reasons not to involve their
parents.178
In contrast, some teens have been found to underestimate the
171. Id.
172. Gayle Geber & Michael D. Resnick, Family Functioning of Adolescents
Who Parent and Place for Adoption, 23 ADOLESCENCE 417, 422 (1988).
173. Catherine Briedis, Marginal Deviants: Teenage Girls Experience Commu-
nity Response to Premarital Sex and Pregnancy, 22 Soc. PROBs. 480 (1974).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Baptiste, supra note 170.
177. Patricia Donovan, Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare When They Seek
Court-Authorized Abortions, 15 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 259, 262 (1983); "Judicial Bypass
Procedure Minnesota/Michigan," presentation by Judge G. Peterson, Mich. Probate
Judges' Mid-Winter Conference (1991).
178. Briedis, supra note 173; Everett L. Worthington, Jr., David B. Larson,
Malvin W. Brubaker, Cheryl Colecchi, James T. Berry, & David Morrow, The Bene-
fits of Legislation Requiring Parental Involvement Prior to Adolescent Abortion, 44
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1542 (1989).
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amount of support they will receive from their parents.179 Not
wanting to disappoint parents, feeling ashamed about the preg-
nancy, wishing not to jeopardize the family relationship, 8 0 as well
as lack of awareness of the degree of support they might receive
prevent some teens from taking their parents into their confi-
dence. When consent is mandated, many teens who would poten-
tially receive support from their parents will still seek other
alternatives rather than discuss their pregnancy at home.181 In-
deed, when a parental notification law was in effect in Minnesota,
judges there found that across two eighteen-month periods, the
greatest percentage of teens (29 and 33 percent respectively) said
that fear of damaging their relationship with their parents was
their primary reason for not notifying them.18 2 Other reasons for
not discussing their abortion decision with parents were less be-
nign. They included parental opposition to abortion that would re-
sult in the minor being expelled from the home (15 and 21
percent), being forced to carry the pregnancy to term (5 and 7 per-
cent), and fear of aggravating already existing problems in the
home (10 and 18 percent). 8 3
Thus, it seems that mandatory parental involvement does not
necessarily lead to family cohesion and in some cases can be harm-
ful to the pregnant teen. A case in point is that of Becky Bell, an
Indiana teenager who died in 1988 of an infection resulting from
an illegal abortion.' 4 Indiana has a parental consent law. Becky
refused to tell her parents she was pregnant because she did not
want to disappoint them, and it was widely rumored among teens
in her town that the judge she would face for a waiver did not
grant them.'8 5 Understandably, the Bells hold the parental con-
sent law responsible for their daughter's death.'8 6
Should minors be forced to discuss pregnancy resolution with
their parents? In the absence of legislation mandating parental in-
volvement in pregnancy resolution, about half of all pregnant
teens do so anyway.' 8 7 The younger the teen, the more likely she
179. Donovan, supra note 177; Judge G. Peterson, supra note 180.
180. Aida Torres, et. al., Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and Adolescents' Use of
Family Planning and Abortion Services, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 284, 288 (1980); See
also, Raye Rosen, Adolescent Pregnancy Decision-Making: Are Parents Impor-
tant?, 15 ADOLESCENCE 43 (1980).
181. Judge Peterson, supra note 177.
182. Id.




187. Rosen, supra note 180.
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is to talk with a parent prior to making a decision. Seventy-five
percent of twelve to fifteen year olds, compared to 54 percent of
sixteen and 46 percent of seventeen year olds, involve at least one
parent. 8 8 Thus, those minors who are most likely to benefit from
involving their parents, namely younger teens, to a great extent al-
ready do so.
It is possible that families who have discussed issues pertain-
ing to sexuality would be better able to cope with an unplanned
adolescent pregnancy. Therefore, it is important to investigate the
extent to which parents provide information about sexuality to
their daughters. Research regarding the content and extent of
communication between teens and parents about sexuality sug-
gests that the most sensitive issues are the most difficult to discuss.
Researchers Litton Fox and Judith Inazu found that parents were
most likely to give information about menstruating and dating and
least likely to discuss their teens' sexual activity and contracep-
tion. 8 9 Further, teens reported feeling uncomfortable with con-
versations between themselves and parents regarding sexuality.190
While parents can and do give useful information and advice to
their adolescent children, the more closely connected conversa-
tions are to the teen's actual sexual activity, the greater the possi-
bility that the topic will be difficult and stressful to discuss.19 '
D. Parental Rights
At this point, it is important to recall that the Supreme Court
has ruled that absolute authority of a third party (including par-
ents) over a teen's decision regarding her pregnancy is a violation
of the teen's due process right to privacy.192 The Court resolved
this conflict by insisting upon a judicial bypass mechanism for
teens who do not wish to involve their parents in their pregnancy
resolution decision.193 Parental rights are therefore recognized by
the Court, but not given more weight than the teen's rights.
Arguments put forth to justify parental involvement main-
tain that parents are responsible for the socialization of their chil-
188. Torres, supra note 180.
189. Greer Litton Fox & Judith K. Inazu, Mother-Daughter Communication
About Sex, 29 FAM. REL. 347 (1980).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
193. Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622.
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dren,194 as well as the financial consequences of their children's
actions,195 and thus should have control over those actions. Even
so, public policymakers have recognized the private nature of some
issues and problems facing teens as well as states' compelling in-
terest in assisting minors who seek medical treatment or assistance
in resolving them. For example, minors acting alone are presently
able to give consent to the prescription of contraceptives,196 to
treatment of sexually transmitted diseases,197 and to obtain drug
and alcohol treatment.198 These examples document recognition
that in some cases teens are able to decide what is best for them,
and that forcing parental involvement has the potential to deter
minors from seeking and receiving medical care.
A further rationale for parental involvement legislation is
that parents will make decisions based on the best interests of
teens. Unfortunately, since it is difficult to know prospectively
what teens' best interests are, to a large extent such decisions
would necessarily be based upon parents' own values and wishes.
Further, empirical evidence that parents do in fact make decisions
taking teens' best interests into account regarding pregnancy reso-
lution currently does not exist.
VI. Consequences to Teens of Parental Consent Legislation
A. Experiences of Teens Who Seek Judicial Bypass
In keeping with the Supreme Court's ruling that parents may
not have absolute veto power over their teen's abortion decision, a
court-mandated judicial bypass clause has been incorporated into
constitutional parental involvement legislation.199 The clause en-
sures that minors who do not wish to involve their parents, or
whose parents will not acquiesce in a teen's wish to abort, can gain
permission to abort from a court. The clause can work in one of
two ways. First, a judge is asked to determine whether a minor
seeking an abortion is sufficiently mature to make her own deci-
sion. If the judge finds adequate maturity, the teen's decision to
abort is upheld.200 If the teen is found to be immature, the judge
must then determine whether an abortion would be in her best in-
194. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632 (1974).
195. See, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248
(1983).
196. MICH. Comp. LAw § 333.9131, § 330.1938.
197. MINN. STAT. § 144.343(1).
198. Mo. REV. STAT. § 431.061 (Supp. 1991).
199. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
200. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490-93 (1983).
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terests, despite her immaturity.20 1 Again, if this is found to be the
case, consent to abort is given.20 2
Under the judicial bypass provisions of most states, a court in
each county has jurisdiction to hear minors' abortion pleas.203 It is
not unusual for a judge to refuse to entertain such requests, how-
ever, forcing the minor to travel long distances from a rural area
to a city where her case can be heard. 04 Because of a paucity of
abortion providers in rural areas,2 0 5 once consent is obtained, she
must often make a second trip to the city in order to have the
abortion.2O6 In some cases, teens have been harassed by judges
who disapprove of their decision to abort or the premarital sexual
activity that put them in their current situation.0 7
A significant criticism of the judicial bypass process is that
judges are required to perform a role for which they are unpre-
pared.2 08 Legal and psychological mechanisms do not exist for as-
sessing either the teen's maturity or her best interests. In
Minnesota, for example, court proceedings have been essentially a
formality, with teens receiving permission to abort in virtually
every case.209 In other states, judicial procedure is an insurmount-
able barrier, where no minor is given permission to abort her fe-
tus.21 0 Wherever the locale, judges have difficulty doing the job
they have been mandated to do.
Psychologist Patricia Donovan has documented additional
problems associated with the judicial bypass process. For example,
because teens must go to court there is a delay in obtaining the
abortion.21 Time is critical in abortion decisions because delays
can advance the pregnancy into the second trimester, increasing
risk and cost,212 or into the third trimester, when abortion is
strictly regulated, and much less likely to be allowed.213
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Donovan, supra note 177.
204. Id.
205. National Abortion Rights Action League, supra note 71, at 186.
206. Donovan, supra note 177.
207. Id.
208. See David Oltman, Juvenile Abortion: State Court Judges Worry About
Law, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 16, 1987, at 1, col. 2.
209. Donovan, supra note 177, at 264.
210. Interview with Robyn Menin, Director of Planned Parenthood of Mid-Mich-
igan (Feb. 4, 1991).
211. Donovan, supra note 177, at 264.
212. Nancy Russo, Adolescent Abortion: The Epidemiological Context, in ADO-
LESCENT ABORTION 40, 56 (G. Melton ed. 1986).
213. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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B. Changes Associated With Parental Involvement
Legislation
The most noticeable effect of parental consent legislation has
been an increase in the number of babies born to teens and greater
difficulty obtaining abortions. Pointing to the experience of one
state, a Utah Department of Health official reported that out-of-
wedlock births to Utah teens had risen following the passage of pa-
rental consent legislation.21 4 In less than two years after parental
consent legislation went into effect, abortions to teens decreased in
three states adopting the law.215 At the same time, abortions pro-
vided to nonresident minors increased in surrounding states within
traveling distance of states mandating parental involvement. 21
6
Of course, there are choices available to teens beyond bearing
a child or traveling to a more liberal locale to abort. Illegal and
self-inflicted abortions have long been used by women who are
desperate to be rid of their pregnancy and who do not perceive (or
have) other options.2 1 7 Data from the United States and Great
Britain suggest that the availability of legal abortion results in
fewer deaths from abortion. Researcher S.L. Barron reported that
while the proportion of women's deaths caused by abortion in Eng-
land and Wales increased at a steady rate from 1952 to 1969, data
from 1973 to 1975 (after abortion laws were relaxed) showed a dra-
matic drop in the rate of death due to abortion.218 Deaths from
"spontaneous" abortion in the same time frame fell even further
than those attributed to illegal abortion,219 suggesting that many
spontaneous abortions were actually induced. A similar pattern
has been found in abortion deaths in the United States.220
Clearly, illegal and self-induced abortions are widely utilized
when safer choices are unavailable or inaccessible. 22 1 Creating
barriers to safe, legal abortions, such as parental involvement leg-
islation, may result in significantly increased teen mortality rates,
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because some pregnant adolescents will end unwanted pregnancies
by unsafe, illegal means when no other choice is open to them.
VII. Conclusions
At present, parental involvement legislation and Supreme
Court decisions have put abortion availability for teens in jeop-
ardy. Since the Supreme Court gave women a greater measure of
control over their reproductive decisions in Roe v. Wade222 in
1973, opponents of abortion have worked to have this landmark de-
cision overturned. There has been a step-by-step process of re-
stricting abortion access to vulnerable groups, with the ultimate
goal of eliminating all legal abortions.223 Indeed, anti-abortion ad-
vocates have successfully eroded access to abortion for a number of
populations, including poor women through revocation of Medicaid
funding.224 Thus, parental involvement legislation can be viewed
as part of an ongoing effort to ban all abortions.
While courts are viewed as impartial purveyors of justice, it is
likely that recent Supreme Court decisions limiting abortion access
are influenced by the current political and social climate, domi-
nated by conservatism and a hearkening back to the traditional
values of paramount respect for family privacy and authority that
anti-abortion advocates represent.225 This perhaps explains why
parental involvement legislation has been embraced, despite a no-
table lack of empirical evidence that it accomplishes the goals it
purports to address.
Teenage pregnancy is an unfortunate social reality and will
not be eliminated through restrictive legislation. Programs teach-
ing teenagers about how to prevent unwanted pregnancy are badly
needed to solve the problem. In the absence of widely available
educational programs of this kind, the medical data indicate abor-
tion should be retained as an accessible, affordable, and safe option
for resolving adolescent pregnancies if unwanted children and
death and injuries to teen mothers are to be avoided.
Assuming that relevant research could influence an increas-
ingly conservative United States Supreme Court, better communi-
cation of existing knowledge to the Court and legislatures is
needed. Further empirical research that adequately addresses the
psychological effects of choices teens make about pregnancy reso-
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lution, as well as evidence about adolescent decision-making per se,
should be undertaken as should studies assessing the impact of ad-
olescent pregnancy and abortion on family cohesion. In addition,
the effects of parental involvement legislation on teens must con-
tinue to be documented. For example, at present we know little
about the ways in which parental involvement in pregnancy reso-
lution impacts the family. We also do not know, and need to learn,
whether parents can be depended upon to uphold the best inter-
ests of their pregnant minor children.
Decisions in cases challenging restrictive legislation should be
better informed by empirical evidence. Indeed, the studies dis-
cussed in this article suggest that the rationales underpinning
court decisions limiting minors' rights to privacy are largely un-
supported by research data. By helping to expose the tenuous as-
sumptions upon which judicial and legislative decisions regarding
parental involvement rest, psychologists and legal scholars can
work together to contribute to thoughtful and responsive
policymaking.

